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THE COMMUNITIES THAT MAKE STANDARDS OF CARE
POSSIBLE
ANITA BERNSTEIN*
INTRODUCTION
"There are two core principles in the law of negligence," writes
Joseph H. King, Jr., a leading scholar of contemporary tort law, by
way of summary introduction., "The first is that negligence law is a
fault-based theory of liability (rather than strict liability), and
therefore requires proof that the defendant's conduct was substan-
dard. The second is that a person's conduct should be evaluated
according to objective criteria, rather than by a subjective assess-
ment." 2 Taking Professor King's "two core principles" as axiomatic,
we may wonder how a liability system applies them.
The axioms make a difference. In a claim for negligence, one
litigant has charged another with fault, a moralistic accusation; King
goes on to say that the litigant also claims that the other has failed to
follow "objective criteria" for behavior. When the claimant (usually
the plaintiff, but sometimes a defendant who asserts contributory
negligence as an affirmative defense)3 prevails, then the accused
(usually the defendant) has been condemned as blameworthy. When
the plaintiff does not prevail, then a loss lies unremedied where it fell.
Affirmative defenses similarly yield either blame or disappointment
at the failure to achieve a remedy for an injury and both blame and
disappointment in those cases where the defenses succeed. It is easy
for us Torts teachers, grown perhaps a bit callous after reading many
* Sam Nunn Professor of Law, Emory University. My thanks to the faculties at Iowa.
Seton Hall, and Pepperdine law schools for the comments they offered when I presented early
versions of this Article. Thanks also to Robert Cochran, Richard Cupp, Patrick Kelley, Jean
Love, Lea VanderVelde. and Richard Wright for constructive criticisms.
1. Joseph H. King, Jr., Reconciling the Exercise of Judgment and the Objective Standard of
Care in Medical Malpractice, 52 OKLA. L. REV. 49, 49 (1999).
2. Id.
3. Although contributory negligence has been superseded in almost every U.S.
jurisdiction by a rule of apportionment, most often called "comparative negligence," the
differences between the old and the new rules are unimportant for present purposes, and
"contributory negligence" is the simplest term available.
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
accounts, not to notice the pain that afflicts losers in our bipolar
negligence-claim game, and to overlook institutional costs that make
even prevailing parties feel that they have suffered a defeat. (Those
of us who like to describe American negligence law as a "lottery"4
may have a better-than-typical understanding of the low ratio of
winners to losers that the system creates.) Even though the applica-
tion of King's axioms spreads sorrow through the citizenry, these
principles continue to operate.
Successful players in a political system, of which the American
common-law negligence system is one, do not maintain their thriving
position by absorbing full responsibility for having doled out suffering
to their clientele. When these successful players are involved in
causing suffering, they need cover, deniability, and the appear-
ance-or perhaps the reality-of not having been the sole source of
anyone's misery. In this Article, I argue that negligence law relies on
what one might call "communities" (for the moment I will postpone
my definitional task) to give its authority some necessary lateral
support, a political and philosophical buttress. Communities soften
the hard surface of the standard of care and allow negligence law to
distance itself from the painful effects of its judgments.
To broach this argument, I start by accepting the prevailing aca-
demic belief that tort law mediates between freedom and security.5
Negligence litigation juxtaposes two parties as antagonists: the
initiator, who protests an infringement of his security (or, in the
context of affirmative defenses, an infringement of his rights with
respect to the plaintiff's claim about security), and the accused, who
contends that she had an entitlement to have behaved as she did.
Because negligence law honors both security and freedom, neither
initiators nor accuseds 6 can be confident that their assertions about
4. See JEFFREY O'CONNELL, THE LAWSUIT LOTTERY: ONLY THE LAWYERS WIN (1979);
Marc A. Franklin, Replacing the Negligence Lottery: Compensation and Selective
Reimbursement, 53 VA. L. REV. 774 (1967).
5. See Jules L. Coleman, Legal Theory and Practice, 83 GEO. L.J. 2579 (1995); John C.P.
Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Moral of MacPherson, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1733,
1754-55 (1998) (identifying the balance between freedom and security as central to the
formation of the objective standard of care); Stephen G. Gilles, On Determining Negligence:
Hand Formula Balancing, the Reasonable Person Standard, and the Jury, 54 VAND. L. REV. 813,
819 (2001) (characterizing the concern with freedom-versus-security as a "social contract
approach" to negligence law); Gregory C. Keating, Reasonableness and Rationality in
Negligence Theory, 48 STAN. L. REV. 311, 313-27 (1996) (relating freedom-versus-security to
the political philosophy of John Rawls).
6. Elsewhere I have grappled with the problem of what to label the two players. Unable
to identify les mots justes, I have settled on not settling on any one locution so as to avoid
occluding the discussion with a false and misleading precision. See Anita Bernstein, Reciprocity,
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their security or freedom will prevail; negligence law dispenses some
of each desideratum. This mediation between freedom and security
means that every actor must accept a measure of external constraint,
not precisely specified ex ante, on her movements. Although her
freedom conduces to social prosperity (as the utilitarian-efficiency
theorists would contend), and may be her birthright as a creature of
reason (in the Kantian tradition), she may not do entirely what she
likes.
Whereas negligence law regards freedom and security as zero-
sum antagonists-at least when they are demanded by their spokes-
persons, defendants and plaintiffs7-there exist other American
institutions that do not think of freedom as contrary to security, or
security as contrary to freedom. Some of these entities fall within the
term "communities" as I use it here. For purposes of negligence law,
and indeed all of law, I argue, the defining condition of a community
is group-based constraint with respect to behaviors that imperil the
physical safety of others. Negligence law concerns itself with
accidental injury; group-based constraint makes an actor less likely to
inflict such injury on other people.
For an example of group-based constraint, consider the Amish as
they are portrayed in American religious liberties cases like
Wisconsin v. Yoder.8 The Amish choose to withdraw from what looks
like the freer world of secular license and submit to a host of special
rules. For another illustration, consider Islamic dress codes for
women, which are perceived by Westerners as contrary to freedom;
some girls and women have flaunted their adherence to these
strictures.9 To members of these religious communities, liberty and
Utility, and the Law of Aggression, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1 (2001) (experimenting with "initiator,"
"aggressor," "putative aggressor," "victim," "complainant," "plaintiff," and other inadequate
terms).
7. The Kantian tradition regards freedom and security not as zero-sum antagonists but as
complements, or two faces of the same coin. Because rights bespeak duties and vice versa,
human freedom cannot exist without due regard for the security of others. Here, then, I am
distinguishing a stance in American litigation from a philosophical antecedent. I thank Richard
Wright for pressing me on the point.
8. 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (upholding the right of Amish parents to keep their children out of
public high schools); see also Mozert v. Hawkins County Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir.
1987) (rejecting a religion-based complaint about a mandatory public school curriculum).
9. An article in a popular magazine provides photographs of garments that government
authorities around the world have banned and other garments that they have ordered women to
wear: Islamic dress appears in both the mandated and prohibited sections. Where a Miniskirt
Can Get You Arrested, MARIE-CLAIRE, Aug. 2001, at 56; see also Ali v. Alamo Rent-a-Car, No.
00-1041, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 3389 (4th Cir. Mar. 6, 2001) (rejecting a religious-liberty claim
to wear Muslim headgear at work); cf. Nathan Diament, Protect Religion Now, FORWARD, Oct.
19, 2001, at 9 (associating head scarves, skull caps, and certain hairstyles with "religious
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restraints on liberty are not antagonists.l0 Submitting themselves to
authority, some persons experience the freedom of conscientious
dissent from secular notions of freedom.
Now if, as I have suggested, negligence law finds it convenient to
exploit constraints that fit within its security-related goals yet derive
from extrinsic sources, so that the legal regime does not have to take
political responsibility for chafing the citizenry with authoritarian
decrees, then negligence law reaps gains-almost free-rider
benefits-from the fact that subgroups or communities exist.i"
Whereas civil and criminal liability instill sullenness along with their
famed general deterrence, an actor who accepts group-based
constraint will feel little resentment when compelled to toe the line as
a member of the group. (Any resentment that he does feel about this
constraint will not be directed toward negligence law.) This actor has
what John Austin called "the habit of obedience," 2 a submissiveness
necessary in any system that relies on positive law-necessary not
only because positive law lacks the resources to decree all that it
wants done and to enforce those decrees, but also to diffuse political
hostility.
We begin to see why negligence law might take note of whether
an actor is a member of a subgroup. Subgroups function as a kind of
unrecognized accessory to negligence law, dispensing freedom and
security in a way that diverts hostility from the legal system. This
hostility is built into American civil litigation. Although negligence
law hands out good news now and then-such as an unexpected entry
of summary judgment for a defendant 3 or a generous award of
freedom").
10. Nomi Maya Stolzenberg discusses this paradox in "He Drew a Circle that Shut Me
Out": Assimilation, Indoctrination, and the Paradox of a Liberal Education, 106 HARV. L. REV.
581 (1993).
11. I am putting aside those communities whose values are antagonistic to the values that
negligence law esteems. This conflict is not manifest in negligence law-communities that favor
waste, carelessness, or imprudence are insignificant in American case law-but it turns up in the
law of dignitary torts. See Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Defamation Law:
Reputation and the Constitution, 74 CAL. L. REV. 691, 714 (1986) ("The common law takes its
function of maintaining community identity so seriously that it will refuse to protect individual
dignity if it determines that a particular community is not worthy of legal support.").
12. JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 168 (Wilfrid E.
Rumble ed., Cambridge University Press 1995) (1832).
13. Many years ago as an unskilled and very junior associate in a big-firm litigation
department, I was stunned to hear the news that the first memorandum of law I had ever filed
had just resulted in an entry of summary judgment in behalf of the firm's client. My supervisor
wryly pointed out that a defendant need not hire Clarence Darrow reincarnate in order to win
summary judgment under Illinois law (I was more familiar at the time with the plaintiff-
favoring, send-it-to-the-jury tradition of New York), but for a week or so I felt like a magician:
[Vol. 77:735
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punitive damages for a plaintiff-more often it will send some kind of
unwelcome message. In addition to facing the pressure of trying to
mediate effectively between freedom and security, negligence law
risks provoking serious resentment when it makes people feel like
losers. Subgroups serve as a useful adjunct to negligence law because
their constraints can feel to members like freedom, or at least less
oppressive than the distant, impersonal commands of negligence
doctrine.
As we move to Professor King's second point, about objective
standards of care, 14 we can take this connection between negligence
and communities to a wider plane than the narrow category of
religious minorities, never a large presence in accident law. Professor
King has traded away precision in order to shorten his axiom: the
standard of care in negligence, though generally identified as
"objective," also allows for "subjective" recognition of certain
characteristics. 15 Commentators agree that although negligence law
requires most actors to follow an abstract, unmodified ideal of care
(an ideal that goes by many names, of which perhaps "the reasonable
person" is most familiar), it treats children, the physically disabled,
and persons acting in the throes of certain emergencies
differently-usually more leniently-than this ideal would demand.16
The objective standard is further revised in the context of profes-
using just paper and Shepard's, I had vaporized a complaint, made a plaintiff disappear from the
docket! This decision by an Illinois court is still my sole personal experience to date with an
unexpected torts decision. It is what I think of when tort reform writers denounce "the lawsuit
lottery." See supra note 4.
14. See King, supra note 1. at 49.
15. I use quotation marks here because the adjectives "objective" and "subjective" are
inexact, even misleading. By convention, however, persons who read and write about
negligence law understand the distinction that these terms pose, as well as their limitations;
henceforth I will omit the quotation marks because they are distracting, while retaining this
doubt about the meaning of these words.
16. This schema excludes one type of subgroup treated less leniently than "the reasonable
person": the common carrier, which is said to be held to "the highest degree of care," or the
care that "a very cautious and prudent person would use," or some other intensifier.
CLARENCE MORRIS & C. ROBERT MORRIS, JR., MORRIS ON TORTS 55 (2d ed. 1980) (citation
omitted). It is unclear how, if at all, these superlatives affect judgments about the care that an
actor has taken. See id. (noting that some jurisdictions define the carrier's duty as "ordinary
care under the circumstances," and characterizing the circumstances as ones which "call for
great care"); DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 261 (2000) (treating the topic of common
carrier duties in a historical chapter); JOHN L. DIAMOND ET AL., UNDERSTANDING TORTS 66
(2d ed. 2000) (contending that "the notion of highest degrees of care [for common carriers],
though not uncommon, makes little sense"). Regardless of whether a common carrier has
unique duties of care, this category is not controversial or significant in litigation today and can
therefore be omitted from a symposium about negligence in contemporary courts.
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sional malpractice, the subject of King's article,17 where actors are
held to the standard of a member of that profession; this standard
seems more demanding than that of "the reasonable person," who
presumably lacks occupational training. As I elaborate below, the
choices between objective and subjective approaches to the standard
of care reveal no particular logic. Nor has scholarly commentary shed
much light on the problem. Writers defend and attack the rules
regarding certain categories-a host of articles, for instance, discuss
the subject of negligence liability for mentally disabled actors8-but
have not adumbrated any principle behind the practice of recognizing
some group memberships as relevant, and deeming others irrelevant,
to an actor's obligations of reasonable care.
Enter the concept of community as group-based constraint.
Communities in this sense get special notice in negligence law. This
locution is alien at first:19 one might find it odd to posit, for instance, a
"community" of children. Why do members of this community allow
outsiders to disenfranchise them and send them to bed early? Why
would the community tattle to teachers, cling to parents, and have so
much trouble building its own norms? A "community" of blind
persons that excludes everyone who is not blind, no matter how
sincerely a non-blind person might identify with concerns relating to
visual impairment, is contrary to ordinary usage. This locution also
prunes away various rhetorical and sentimental meanings that grew in
the American vernacular during the 1980s, when "communitarian-
ism" arose. Indeed. Negligence law is indifferent to most of what
goes on in the name of community. For this purpose, it concerns
itself only with constraint. 20
17. See King, supra note 1.
18. See Elizabeth J. Goldstein, Asking the Impossible: The Negligence Liability of the
Mentally 111, 12 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 67 (1995); John V. Jacobi, Fakers, Nuts, and
Federalism: Common Law in the Shadow of the ADA, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 95 (1999); Harry
J.F. Korrell, The Liability of Mentally Disabled Tort Defendants, 19 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 1
(1995); Edward P. Richards, Public Policy Implications of Liability Regimes for Injuries Caused
by Persons with Alzheimer's Disease, 35 GA. L. REV. 621 (2001).
19. Some readers have found this use of the word "communities" jarring and misplaced. I
defend it below. See generally infra Part III (parsing the term).
20. 1 intend no disregard of the torts literature about the civil jury as "Meliorator and
Repository of Community Values." DOBBS, supra note 16, at 35: see also Patrick J. Kelley, Who
Decides? Community Safety Conventions at the Heart of Tort Liability, 38 CLEV. ST. L. REV.
315, 380-82 (1990) (arguing that the jury is at the center of negligence determinations);
Catharine Pierce Wells, Tort Law as Corrective Justice: A Pragmatic Justification for Jury
Adjudication, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2348, 2383-90 (1990) (noting function of the jury as a
counterweight against formulaic abstraction). As a source of community values, the jury
functions extradoctrinally; here I am considering "communities" at the heart of doctrinal rules.
[Vol. 77:735
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Consistent with its preference for objective standards of behav-
ior, the type of constraint that interests negligence law is constraint
derived from a characteristic that more than one person can hold at
the same time. One could imagine a profound constraint that
severely hampers freedom, but is beyond the ken of negligence law
because only the constrained person can understand the compulsion.
Group-based constraint, then, refers to characteristics that are
common to more than one individual. The existence of a "group,"
however, does not necessarily mean that membership in the shared
entity disciplines the actor: used in this sense, "constraint" is not
adjudicatory, like the practices of tribal leadership that mete out
something resembling American secular rituals of process. Group-
based constraint can be any kind of characteristic shared with others
that limits the freedom of an actor to exercise his freedom to inflict
accidental harm-usually by incapacitating him in a verifiable way,2 1
but sometimes (as in the case of medical malpractice, particularly
during the middle decades of the twentieth century) through social,
peer-enforced judgments.
The focus of this inquiry into group membership is always the
risk of accidental harm. If membership in a particular group does not
hamper actors in behaviors that risk injuring other people-consider
for example my own memberships in "women" and "Jews," affilia-
tions that do not stop me much from hurting others by accident-then
the standard of care will tend to ignore the actor's membership in the
group. Conversely, if group-based membership does constrain an
actor from injuring other people accidentally, then negligence law will
note the existence of the group and "outsource" the liability question
toward that group and away from an abstract universal ideal about
Persons, unmodified.
"Freedom" and "constraint" are inexact concepts, and negli-
gence law, (in)famous for fluidity, can accommodate various degrees
of constraint. Being a child constrains a person, for instance, but not
all children are equally young or immature; some choose to pursue
what negligence law calls adult activities or dangerous activities; some
injure themselves, and some injure other people. I explore some of
these nuanced treatments of constraint below. The general idea here
is that the less constraint a group membership imposes on an actor,
21. See KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, THE FORMS AND FUNCTIONS OF TORT LAW 58-60 (1997)
(contending that verifiability is central to the standard of care). I return briefly to verifiability
below. See infra note 65.
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the more negligence law will be inclined to treat the actor as if he
were not a member of a group, and therefore deem him not entitled
to the negligence law benefits of membership. By limiting freedom
while making limits look external to law, and fostering security by the
same means, "communities" do some of the work of negligence
doctrine.22
I. THREE STANDARD-OF-CARE PUZZLES
As an explanation of the standard of care in contemporary
American case law, the communities thesis sheds particular light on
three dark corners.
A. What Is the Objective Standard, and What Justifies It?
The official story sites origination of the objective standard for
judging behavior in the mid-nineteenth century, when industrializa-
tion gave rise to a modern law of accidents. New machinery tended
to hurt numerous human bodies, especially those of laborers and
travelers who came into contact with that high-tech innovation, the
network of railroads. A proliferation of injury pressed tort law to
devise rules about new risks. In this development the repeat-player
defendant,23 a business enterprise that regularly generates physical
injuries through the course of its operations, came into view. Unlike
the pre-industrial enterprises that preceded them, newer industries,
starting with railroads, came to be thought of as defendants in
perpetuity: the repeat-player defendant can expect to be litigating
personal injury claims as long as it stays solvent and in business.
The rise of the repeat-player defendant preceded, and may have
helped to generate, a literature about this new creature. Writers
22. Negligence doctrine may or may not need to reward these communities for their
services. At one end of the continuum, apolitical communities like children can demand no
quid for their quo. At the other end, physicians have been handed the power to write their own
unique rules about what acts and omissions constitute negligence; negligence law turns over
explicitly to this community almost all contentions that a member breached a professional
standard of care. See Toth v. Cmty. Hosp. at Glen Cove, 239 N.E.2d 368, 372 (N.Y. 1968)
(noting that "[tlhe law generally permits the medical profession to establish its own standard of
care"); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 189 (5th ed.
1984) (noting that the medical profession has "the privilege, which is usually emphatically
denied to other groups, of setting their own legal standards of conduct, merely by adopting their
own practices") (footnote omitted).
23. This term is an anachronism. See Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead:
Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 95, 97 (1974) (pioneering this
concept).
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pondered its capacity to guard against risk, the scope of its account-
ability for harm, and the need to strike a balance between allowing it
to carry on its activities and keeping it from causing too much
unremedied injury. These jurists, notably Frederick Pollock in
England and, in the United States, Oliver Wendell Holmes and
Lemuel Shaw, both of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts,
inaugurated modern tort law, with its signature attention to the
defendant's responsibility vel non.24 What some contemporary
scholars have identified as a nineteenth-century move from strict
liability to fault or negligence 25 may be understood more pre-
cisely-or at least less controversially-as a move toward greater
focus on the defendant as an actor.26
Whether impelled by the sheer volume of accidental injury (that
is, a volume of aggregate harm that was too costly for industry to
absorb and pass along to customers) or, as Holmes and others argued,
by the demands of reason, some kind of fault rule appeared necessary
in the nineteenth century. The courts would impose liability on those
defendants whose conduct they would condemn as at fault, while
exonerating those whose acts or omissions did not meet the criteria of
the fault rule. Once the commitment to fault emerged, another
question arose: What does it mean to be at fault? In later decades
scholars would explore the question at subtler new levels: fault as
waste or aggregate disutility, fault as a breach of Kantian or Aristote-
lian ethics, fault as transgression of local norms, and the like. But this
early in the official story, lawyers sought to give content to the fault
standard at a general level, to cover the wide new world of accidents.
In 1837, the Court of Common Pleas in England decided
Vaughan v. Menlove,27 bestowing on the common law a fundamental
point of fault doctrine that remains in place today. The Vaughan
court faced a choice. A fault standard might condemn an actor for
24. See FREDERICK POLLOCK, THE LAW OF TORTS (1887); O.W. HOLMES, JR., THE
COMMON LAW (1881); Brown v. Kendall, 60 Mass. 292 (1850) (Shaw, J.). By definition, of
course, tort law has always concerned itself with the defendant's responsibility. The nineteenth-
century shift was to put this concern at center stage, thereby displacing such earlier
preoccupations as the strictures of the trespass writ.
25. See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, at
85-99 (1977); Charles 0. Gregory, Trespass to Negligence to Absolute Liability, 37 VA. L. REV.
359, 368 (1951).
26. See generally P.S. Atiyah, The Legacy of Holmes Through English Eyes, 63 B.U. L.
REV. 341, 362 (1983) (suggesting that the nineteenth-century view, though of great value to the
development of tort law, neglected plaintiffs' rights and interests and did not adequately
distinguish between types of damage).
27. 132 Eng. Rep. 490 (C.P. 1837).
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not having done all he could have done, for not fulfilling his own
potential, or for not acting in good faith to the best of his ability.
Alternatively, fault might be perceived as deviation from a universal
ideal, a failure to hew to the standards to which all persons ought to
be held.28 Assuming that human beings vary innately (or in a way
they cannot control) from one another in their capacity to live up to
an ideal-that, in other words, every person proceeds through life
with a unique blend of temperament, capacity for judgment, intelli-
gence or wisdom, taste for risk, ability to take into account the well-
being of others, and the like-the two approaches will point
sometimes in opposing directions. The most familiar instance of
divergence arises when a defendant uses the subjective standard to
plead for leniency. The subjective standard exonerates the actor
whose abilities are less than those of the universal norm if the actor
measured up to his own lesser potential while causing an injury; the
objective standard insists that the actor must be held liable where he
fails to meet an impersonal ideal standard.9 In Vaughan, the
defendant Menlove argued that he could not comply with an
objective standard because he had "the misfortune of not possessing
the highest order of intelligence."30
Chief Justice Tindal rejected the defense argument, characteriz-
ing it as a demand that "liability for negligence should be co-extensive
with the judgment of each individual."31 A bad idea, Tindal contin-
ued, because individual judgment is "as variable as the length of the
foot of each individual." 32 The man of ordinary prudence standard,
by contrast, provides juries with clear and unitary guidance.33
28. As later stated in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283 (1965):
[T]he law has made use.., of a hypothetical "reasonable man." Sometimes this
person is called a reasonable man of ordinary prudence, or an ordinarily prudent man,
or a man of average prudence, or a man of reasonable sense exercising ordinary care.
It is evident that all such phrases are intended to mean very much the same thing. The
actor is required to do what this ideal individual would do in his place. The reasonable
man is a fictitious person, who is never negligent, and whose conduct is always up to
standard. He is not to be identified with any real person; and in particular he is not to
be identified with the members of the jury, individually or collectively.
29. A similar difference in outcome arises when the actor's abilities are greater, rather than
less, than those of the universal ideal; here, of course, the subjective standard would tend to
favor liability while the objective standard would exonerate the actor. Except in the context of
professional malpractice, however, this variation is relatively insignificant. Because the actor
knows more about his own deviation than does the accuser, accounts of deviation that reach the
courts will emphasize inferiority rather than superiority.
30. 132 Eng. Rep. at 492.
31. Id. at 493.
32- Id.
33. Id.
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Tindal's approach to the subjective-versus-objective difficulty appears
to emphasize administrative convenience: one standard is easier to
apply than many. Holmes too may have had administrative conven-
ience in mind when he defended the Vaughan result (without actually
citing the case), although his expression cast the objective standard as
something to which the actor's "neighbors" are entitled:
If, for instance, a man is born hasty and awkward, is always having
accidents and hurting himself or his neighbors, no doubt his con-
genital defects will be allowed for in the courts of Heaven, but his
slips are no less troublesome to his neighbors than if they sprang
from guilty neglect. His neighbors accordingly require him, at his
proper peril, to come up to their standard, and the courts which
they establish decline to take his personal equation into account. 34
Although Holmes and Tindal spoke of the putative wrongdoer as
a human being, the objective standard proved expedient as a way to
judge the new repeat-player industrial defendant as well as frail
humanity; and acclaim for this analytic device, like the repeat-player
defendant category itself, grew over the next century. Almost with
one voice, commentators following Holmes have deemed the
objective standard to be not only administratively convenient but
substantively right.35 The economists agree with the philosophers;36
critical and feminist theorists do not protest; case law is consistent, at
least on its surface. That the basic standard of care in negligence
ought to be objective rather than subjective is one of the least
controversial points in the Anglo-American common law of acci-
dents. Because of the absence of controversy, perhaps, commenta-
tors following Tindal and Holmes have devoted little energy to the
34. HOLMES, supra note 24, at 108.
35. See generally King, supra note 1, at 49 n.1 (noting that the objective standard conduces
to "the overriding compensatory (loss-spreading, distributional) goals of tort law" and that it
"better promotes safety and loss reduction by its aspirational normative focus"). It should be
noted that this happy harmony is limited to negligence; for contributory negligence, significant
case law and commentary support a subjective standard. See infra Part I.C.
36. Compare WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE
OF TORT LAW 126-28 (1978) (explaining that high information costs justify the objective
standard and that exceptions to the objective standard are implemented only where "the cost of
determining the individual's due care level is low"), and Warren F. Schwartz, Objective and
Subjective Standards of Negligence: Defining the Reasonable Person to Induce Optimal Care and
Optimal Populations of Injurers and Victims, 78 GEO. L.J. 241 (1989) (concluding that courts'
application of the objective standard and use of subjective exceptions is justified by an economic
theory underlying the use of a single standard), with Jules L. Coleman, Legal Theory and
Practice, 83 GEO. L.J. 2579, 2603-04 (1995) (favoring the objective standard because it comports
with a generalized conception of liberty and security for all persons), and Richard W. Wright,
The Standards of Care in Negligence Law, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW
249, 257-59 (David G. Owen ed., 1995) (identifying the objective standard as congruent with
Kantian moral theory).
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task of explaining the status quo in the law, and to date the literature
still lacks a robust defense of this choice.37
B. What Explains and Unites the Subjective Exceptions to the
Objective Standard?
The smooth sea of the objective standard is dotted with islands of
subjective exceptions that supplement and support, rather than
contradict, the ideal of objectivity. An early defense of one subjective
deviation, made in behalf of blind persons and, by extension, persons
with physical disabilities, appears in The Common Law:
When a man has a distinct defect of such a nature that all can rec-
ognize it as making certain precautions impossible, he will not be
held answerable for not taking them. A blind man is not required
to see at his peril; and although he is, no doubt, bound to consider
his infirmity in regulating his actions, yet if he properly finds him-
self in a certain situation, the neglect of precautions requiring eye-
sight would not prevent his recovering for any injury to himself,
and, it may be presumed, would not make him liable for injuring
another.38
In Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical Harms
(Basic Principles), this deviation from the objective standard is
extended to "physical disability" generally: "If an actor has a physical
disability, the actor's conduct is negligent if it does not conform to
37. The problem dates back to the earliest classic on the subject in the law review
literature, which reports, after surveying case law, that a general theory of the conflict between
objective and subjective approaches is unavailable. See Warren A. Seavey,
Negligence-Subjective or Objective?, 41 HARV. L. REV. 1, 5 (1927) ("It would not seem
possible, therefore, to say more than that as to some elements, an objective test is used, meaning
by this that some external standard is set up with which, as to such elements, the actor's conduct
is compared."). Critiquing the utilitarian-efficiency endorsement of an objective standard,
Richard Wright finds a subjective standard at least as congenial for economic analysts.
Efficiency would require an actor "to invest in care only to the point where the marginal cost of
such care does not exceed the marginal benefits in reduced risk. Due to differing capacities and
thus costs of care, this point will vary for each individual." Wright, supra note 36, at 258.
Wright goes on to elaborate that economist analysts assume, but do not show, that the objective
standard is "a second-best efficient solution" to the problem of "very high administrative costs"
associated with a subjective approach. Id. Having established that utilitarian-efficiency acclaim
for the objective standard is unsound, Professor Wright goes on to defend the objective
standard with reference to Kant: "[T]he question is one of objective Right rather than subjective
virtue. The external exercise of freedom depends on sufficient security against interferences by
others with one's person and property." Id. This perspective, yet another scholarly conjunction
of freedom and security, perceives invasions from the plaintiff's or victim's perspective. From
that vantage point, however, strict liability would serve at least as well as negligence; Wright has
not so much defended the objective standard as rejected excuses or defenses based on inability
to fulfill its demands. He has, however, noted a significant distinction between negligence and
contributory negligence.
38. HOLMES, supra note 24, at 109.
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that of a reasonably careful person with the same disability."39
Consistent with its predecessor Restatement, the Third Restatement
also grants children a deviation from the objective ideal: "When the
actor is a child, the actor's conduct is negligent if it does not conform
to that of a reasonably careful person of the same age, intelligence,
and experience." 40 Scholars date this exception as having appeared in
the beginning of the twentieth century.4 The deviation appears to
move in the direction of leniency: more lenient still is the Third
Restatement's assertion that "[a] child who is less than five years of
age is incapable of negligence."42
Tort law also judges members of a profession with reference to
their subgroup, rather than the objective ideal, if the complaint has
accused them of negligence in carrying out their occupational duties.
This doctrinal stance reaches its apex with respect to physicians:
negligence law only rarely tolerates a judgment of liability against a
physician if the plaintiff cannot produce expert testimony from a
physician to show the defendant's failure to comply with professional
custom or a substantially accepted practice.3 In this view, the
category of a profession, like a disabling condition, differentiates the
actor from other people, rendering him extraordinary rather than
ordinary.4
The paradigm of objective-ideal-tempered-by-subjective-
deviation occasionally attempts to describe the nature of the depar-
tures, but cannot. On the one hand, courts and commentators
continually assert that various subjective departures impose a
"lower,"45 "lesser," 46 or "less onerous"47 standard. In this view a
court will make an allowance for infirmity, 48 reject the unfairness of
39. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM (BASIC
PRINCIPLES) § 11(a) (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2001) [hereinafter BASIC PRINCIPLES].
40. Id. § 10(a). The Second Restatement version of the rule appears in RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 283A (1965).
41. See Caroline Forell, Reassessing the Negligence Standard of Care for Minors, 15 N.M. L.
REV. 485, 488-89 (1985).
42. BASIC PRINCIPLES, supra note 39, § 10(b).
43. See Hazel Glenn Beh & Milton Diamond, An Emerging Ethical and Medical Dilemma:
Should Physicians Perform Sex Assignment Surgery on Infants with Ambiguous Genitalia?, 7
MICH. J. GENDER & L. 1, 27-34 (2000).
44. See id. (discussing this stance, and suggesting that unmodified principles of negligence
should govern medical malpractice).
45. Holmes v. City of Oakland, 67 Cal. Rptr. 197, 202 (Ct. App. 1968).
46. DOBBS, supra note 16, at 277.
47. Caroline Forell, Essentialism, Empathy, and the Reasonable Woman, 1994 U. ILL. L.
REV. 769, 779.
48. Cf. VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ ET AL., PROSSER, WADE AND SCHWARTZ'S TORTS: CASES
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holding actors to rigors they are "incapable" of meeting,49 and
tolerate or condone behavior that "falls short" of reasonable care.50
These descriptions view the disabilities of childhood or physical
limitations as worthy of indulgent treatment: the actor, unlike most
persons, is allowed to behave dangerously and get away with it.
On the other hand, as judges and scholars have observed, this
notion of subjective deviations as "protective" 51 or "tending to
advantage the actor" 52 is sometimes misleading. For example, the
Nebraska Supreme Court once had occasion to note that the
decedent, a visually handicapped person, had fulfilled her obligation
to wear special glasses and add mirrors to her vehicle,5 3 an extra
burden that the non-handicapped do not bear. In a comment to
Third Restatement blackletter, Gary Schwartz added that "a blind
person may be found negligent for walking over [unfamiliar] terrain
without a cane or some other form of assistance"; a person who is not
blind is free to walk over unfamiliar terrain in such a way.54
A parallel problem emerges in professional malpractice, where
some authorities say that the actor who is a professional-here again
we focus on physicians-is held to a higher standard of care than the
reasonable person. "The standard of care required for medical care
givers is higher than the standard of care required of ordinary
laypersons," asserted the Texas Court of Appeals in a recent
decision.55 In Johnson v. Westfield Memorial Hospital, Inc.,56 a New
York appellate court also spoke of "higher" standards, placing an
ophthalmologist on an upper rung and a nonspecialist physician on
AND MATERIALS 165 (10th ed. 2000) ("Most courts do not make any allowance for the mental
illness of the defendant-the defendant is judged by the standard of the reasonable person.");
see also id. at 162 (noting that "a similar allowance has been made for the physical and mental
deficiencies of old age").
49. Bauman v. Crawford, 704 P.2d 1181, 1184 (Wash. 1985) (stating that "it would be unfair
to predicate legal fault upon a standard most children are incapable of meeting").
50. Korrell, supra note 18, at 1.
51. DOBBS, supra note 16, at 282-83 (noting that the "physical disability rule is not always
protective of disabled persons").
52. BASIC PRINCIPLES, supra note 39, § 11 cmt. b ("Physical disability can both advantage
and disadvantage actors ... as the possible negligence of their past conduct is considered.").
53. See Traphagan v. Mid-America Traffic Marking, 555 N.W.2d 778, 787 (Neb. 1996).
54. BASIC PRINCIPLES, supra note 39, § 11 cmt. b. For a contemporary case in accord, see
Poyner v. Loftus, 694 A.2d 69, 72-73 (D.C. 1997).
55. Rehabilitative Care Sys. of Am. v. Davis, 43 S.W.3d 649, 657 (Tex. App. 2001). To
support this higher standard, the court noted that "physicians and other medical care givers
possess greater skill and knowledge than laypersons." Id.
56. 710 N.Y.S.2d 862 (App. Div. 2000).
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the rung directly below.5 7 The defendant, a physician's assistant, was
held to an undifferentiated ordinary standard.58
In a phenomenon that parallels the view that physically disabled
actors are held to a standard that is merely different, not lower,
several commentators deny that the standard of care required of
professionals is higher or more strenuous than that expected of a
reasonable person. These scholars become less articulate, however,
when they try to say what that standard is. Superior skills are deemed
"a mere circumstance," for instance, in the Third Restatement's rather
opaque phrase: "[E]ven though the actor's extra skills can properly be
considered, these skills do not establish for the actor a standard of
care that is higher than reasonable care; rather, they provide a mere
circumstance for the jury to consider in determining whether the
actor has complied with the general standard of reasonable care." 59
Another commentator calls the physician standard of care "nar-
rower," and then a few sentences later "higher," than the ordinary
undifferentiated standard, using the two adjectives as apparent
synonyms.60 Professor Dobbs points out that in particular instances
the physician standard can be more lenient or indulgent than the
ordinary reasonable person standard: for example, medical custom
could approve of several alternative courses of treatment, whereas
the reasonable person might well choose only the most prudent of
these alternatives.6
Not higher, not lower, just different is the message from scholars.
And yet this correction of what seems an error may itself need
57. See id. at 863.
58. Id. The idea of professionals as standing above ordinary persons in case law spreads
beyond negligence. Feldman v. Tennessee Board of Medical Examiners, No. M1999-00474-
COA-R7-CV, 2000 Tenn. App. LEXIS 257 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 26, 2000), a disciplinary
decision, characterized the physician-appellant as having argued in effect that his misdeeds were
not egregious enough to warrant being put on probation; disagreeing, the Tennessee Court of
Appeals noted that the Board of Medical Examiners had deemed Dr. Feldman's behavior
"unprofessional" but not "dishonorable or unethical, thus sustaining a valuable distinction that
the appellant would rather we ignore. Such a distinction is consistent with the idea that an
individual who has been entrusted with a license to a [sic] practice medicine is charged with a
higher standard of conduct than is a layperson." Id. at *11.
59. BASIC PRINCIPLES, supra note 39, § 12 cmt. a. There is no separate provision in the
Basic Principles on professional negligence, but section 12 states that "[i]f an actor has skills or
knowledge that exceed those possessed by most others, these skills or knowledge are
circumstances to be taken into account in determining whether the actor has behaved as a
reasonably careful person," and the Reporters' Note indicates that the section "can easily be
applied to cases involving the liability of professionals." Id., Reporters' Note at 168.
60. Jodi M. Finder, The Future of Practice Guidelines: Should They Constitute Conclusive
Evidence of the Standard of Care?, 10 HEALTH MATRIX 67, 78 (2000).
61. DOBBS, supra note 16, at 633-34.
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correction. Different in what way? Why aren't the "hasty and
awkward" 62 different too? Given the unitary ambitions of the
reasonable person standard-and the defeat of the maladroit
Menlove in 1837,63 an outcome that almost everyone in torts has
cheered-what justifies the creation of patchy subjective exceptions
now and then? The higher versus lower, upward-departure versus
downward-departure schema at least lines up with the experience of
everyday hierarchy that most of us share, divided into three familiar
tiers: a wide middle, where the reasonable person may be found,
separates those few who deviate in either direction, low and high.64
Imprecise statements about the standard of care accept this division;
specialists say that it is wrong; and negligence law still lacks a theory
to unify its subjective exceptions to the objective standard of care. 65
C. Is Negligence Different from Contributory Negligence?
The paradigm of unitary-ideal-tempered-by-subjective-deviation
does not account for the courts' tendency to treat negligence differ-
ently from contributory negligence. In the standard account, as we
have seen, a small number of conditions that are believed to affect an
actor's capacity become the basis for exceptional treatment. When
these conditions are absent, the actor in principle must hew to the
universal ideal to avoid being found contributorily negligent.66
Although nothing in the paradigm accounts for treating negligence
62. See supra text accompanying note 34.
63. See supra text accompanying notes 27-33.
64. When I typed "low w/3 middle w/3 high" into Lexis's MEGA library and MEGA file
on September 8, 2001, 1 found this three-tier hierarchy invoked in a variety of cases. The
concept turned up in discussions of shareholder appraisals, educational tracking, federal
sentencing guidelines, contract disputes, land use, and other contexts.
65. Torts scholars and teachers usually fall back on two well-worn locutions when asked to
state the common characteristic of all islands of subjectivity: "verifiability" and "administrative
convenience." Neither term does the job of unifying the categories that receive a subjective
exception to the unitary objective standard. Verifiability in an actor's condition may be
necessary in order for negligence law to take note of that condition, but it is certainly not
sufficient. I have brown eyes, as you can tell by looking. My weight and blood type are also
verifiable. But these verifiable conditions do not determine, or even affect, the standard of care
to which I am held; if I tried to argue that brown eyes give me a relaxed obligation of reasonable
care (or perhaps, taking a leaf from malpractice law, that a plaintiff needs testimony from a
person with 0-negative blood about the 0-negative defendant's behavior in order to survive
summary judgment), I would not get far. "Administrative convenience" seems to cover the
same ground as "verifiability"; one is hard-pressed to find anything more than a conclusion
derived from the observation of judicial behavior: if courts do something, observers call that
thing convenient. Neither of the two locutions tells us what will or should happen when an
actor (like Mr. Menlove) asks for the boon of a subjective standard.
66. See DOBBS, supra note 16, at 284.
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differently from contributory negligence, the Second Restatement was
willing to condone a relaxed standard for contributory negligence in a
couple of contexts,67 and case law has long been replete with such
divergence.68
Mental disability is the condition that provokes the most disarray
in this area. Both judges and scholars have written that in evaluating
the behavior of a mentally disabled actor they favor an objective
standard when the actor has hurt others, and a subjective standard
when the actor has hurt himself.69 Decisional law so holding comes
from not only the era of full-bar contributory negligence but also the
current climate of apportionment, suggesting that this tendency
cannot be written off as mere pity for helpless (and bygone) wretches
who would otherwise recover nothing even though their contribution
to their own injury was slight.70 One contemporary case, evaluating
the behavior of an eight-year-old plaintiff who had a mild learning
disability, stated that under New York law "a plaintiff with dimin-
ished mental capacity may not be held to any greater degree of care
for his own safety than that which he is capable of exercising."71
Another federal court, applying state law, also took a stance contrary
to the Third Restatement:
[In Missouri and in many other courts there is a double standard of
conduct with respect to negligence and contributory negligence.
Ordinarily the standard of conduct applicable to one person injur-
ing another by his acts or omissions is an objective standard. But
with respect to contributory negligence, in Missouri and in many
other states a subjective standard is applied to children and persons
suffering from a mental deficiency. 72
67. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 463-464(1) (1965).
68. See Galindo v. TMT Transp., Inc., 733 P.2d 631, 633 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986) ("Some
authorities support the adoption of a double standard of care, namely an objective, external
standard for defendant's negligence and a 'relaxed,' subjective standard for contributory
negligence.") (citation omitted).
69. Writing in the contributory negligence era, Fleming James explicitly advocated such an
approach. See Fleming James, Jr., Contributory Negligence, 62 YALE L.J. 691 (1953); Fleming
James, Jr. & John J. Dickinson, Accident Proneness and Accident Law, 63 HARV. L. REV. 769,
786-89 (1950).
70. Cf. BASIC PRINCIPLES, supra note 39, § 11 cmt e ("The shift in tort doctrine from
contributory negligence as a full defense to comparative responsibility as a partial defense
weakens whatever arguments there otherwise might favor a dual standard.").
71. Banks v. United States, 969 F. Supp. 884, 893 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (citations omitted); see
also Mochen v. State, 352 N.Y.S.2d 290, 294 (App. Div. 1974) ("A plaintiff whose judgment has
been blunted by mental disability should not have his conduct measured by external standards
applicable to a reasonable normal adult anymore [sic] than a physically disabled plaintiff is held
to the same standards of activity as a plaintiff without such a disability.") (citations omitted).
72. Snider v, Callahan, 250 F. Supp. 1022, 1023 (W.D. Mo. 1966) (citations omitted).
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Indeed, the state courts that favor a relaxed standard for plain-
tiffs seem to constitute a majority of those that have addressed the
question,73 despite the stance in the Third Restatement insisting that
mentally disabled plaintiffs be treated the same as mentally disabled
defendants.74 Analyzing the cases, Gary Schwartz admitted that they
take a variety of positions.75 Although the Reporters' Note obscured
this point somewhat, most of the decisions mentioned do not support
the Third Restatement view, and several of them relax the standard of
care for plaintiffs. 76
Professor Schwartz may have been right when he implied in
Basic Principles that courts, influenced by obsolete vestiges left over
from the time of contributory negligence, are making wrong decisions
in favor of plaintiffs.77 In this view, the Third Restatement, by refusing
to distinguish negligence from comparative negligence, simply
modernizes accident law. But it is not obvious that ignoring plaintiffs'
mental deficiencies is more progressive or up-to-the-minute than
taking it into account. One student commentator, in apparent
disagreement with this thesis about a unitary standard as moderniza-
tion, claims that the unitary approach is old and the "double stan-
dard" new: she writes that "[r]ecently... courts have applied a more
lenient standard" to mentally deficient plaintiffs, having traditionally
refused to make any allowance for this deviation. 78
The Second Restatement's treatment of this point is telling. Its
draftsmen eschewed overt pity for plaintiffs and chose a vague,
hemming-and-hawing, it-all-depends-on-the-circumstances tack to say
73. See Alison P. Raney, Note, Stacy v. Jedco Construction, Inc.: North Carolina Adopts a
Diminished Capacity Standard for Contributory Negligence, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1215,
1226-31 (1996) (summarizing cases).
74. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 3 cmt. a (1999)
(abolishing "certain ameliorative doctrines" for defining plaintiff's negligence); BASIC
PRINCIPLES, supra note 39, § 11 cmt. e (justifying disregard of actor's mental and emotional
disability and applying rule equally to issues of negligence and contributory negligence).
75. BASIC PRINCIPLES, supra note 39, § 11, cmt. e.
76. Id., Reporters' Note at 160. This paragraph about mentally disabled plaintiffs cites
nine cases. Some of these decisions both support and refute the Third Restatement view: for
instance, courts have ruled against the plaintiff but declared in dicta that a relaxed standard will
sometimes be proper. See Fox v. City & County of San Francisco, 120 Cal. Rptr. 779 (Cal.
1975); Hobart v. Shin, 705 N.E.2d 907 (111. 1998); Jankee v. Clark County, 612 N.W.2d 297, 318
(Wis. 2000). Other cited cases explicitly endorse a relaxed standard for plaintiffs. See Stacy v.
Jedco Constr., Inc., 457 S.E.2d 875, 879 (N.C. Ct. App. 1995); Feldman v. Howard, 214 N.E.2d
235, 237 (Ohio Ct. App. 1966).
77. BASIC PRINCIPLES, supra note 39, § 11, Reporters' Note at 160.
78. Raney, supra note 73, at 1215.
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why the rule for plaintiffs might perhaps be different from the rule for
defendants:
[T]he application of the standard to particular facts may lead to dif-
ferent conclusions as to whether the same conduct constitutes neg-
ligence or contributory negligence.... There may be circumstances
in which a jury may reasonably conclude that a reasonable man
would take more, or less, precaution for the protection of others
than for his own safety. Thus the risk of harm to others may be
more apparent, or apparently more serious, than the risk of harm to
the actor himself.... He may have undertaken a responsibility to-
ward another which requires him to exercise an amount of care for
the protection of the other which he would not be required to exer-
cise for his own safety. The relation of the parties, the particular
circumstances, and all other relevant factors are to be taken into
account. In the great majority of cases it is probably true that the
same conduct will constitute both negligence and contributory neg-
ligence, but it does not necessarily follow in all cases. 79
Interesting. Mentally disabled plaintiffs have always been the
hard case in contributory negligence-the recurring instance of a gap
between defendants' and plaintiffs' standards-but the Second
Restatement does not purport to speak about these people, preferring
instead a generic reference to relationships. Moreover, the Second
Restatement refuses to characterize its departure as either upward or
downward (its drafters speak neutrally of "more, or less, precau-
tion"), even though case law and scholarly writings typically deem the
plaintiff's standard lower or "relaxed." Although it cannot find
precise words to express its stance and has to fall back on "circum-
stances," "the relation of the parties," "prior undertakings," and "all
other relevant factors" in its treatment of plaintiff negligence, the
Second Restatement manifests its recognition of something like the
group-based constraint that communities impose.
II. COMMUNITY = CONSTRAINT
One dictionary gives nine definitions of the word "community."80
Sociologists, not to be outdone, have long found dozens and dozens
of meanings in the word.S1 The aspect of this term relevant to the
standard of care relates to limits on freedom. Just as negligence law
posits that the person of ordinary prudence acts or refrains from
79. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 464 cmt. f (1965).
80. WEBSTER'S NEW UNIVERSAL UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 414 (1996).
81. See George A. Hillery, Jr., Definitions of Community: Areas of Agreement, 20 RURAL
SOCIOLOGY 111 (1955) (classifying and analyzing ninety-four meanings of the word
"community").
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action because of an internalized sense that not all behaviors may be
pursued or avoided simply as she pleases, negligence law also sees the
person attached to a "community" similarly constrained with respect
to risky actions. Regardless of whether constraint derives from an
actor's voluntary membership in a group or from an unchosen
characteristic such as a physical disability, a person hampered by
group-based constraint has fewer choices and prerogatives with
respect to risky behaviors than a person who is not so attached. 82
This rather pinched interpretation of "community" does not dis-
parage other meanings of the word, which emphasize the deep
importance of networks and relationships to human life; it articulates
only the law's concerns, which are of course only a small fraction of
all social concerns.83 An understanding of the importance of
constraint in defining community pervades the law. Consider
geography, for instance, listed first among numerous definitions of
community in one dictionary: "[a] group of people living in the same
locality and under the same government."8 4 For purposes of the law,
geographic constraints can sometimes matter: contexts like land use
and "community policing"85 refer to the people affected geographi-
cally by law-related change, but will sometimes not matter, as in a
parent wondering who from her neighborhood will go to the same
state university campus as her teenager. For law, constraint is the
linchpin.86 Only when geography signifies constraint-dishes in your
82. Here I take no position on the philosophical or socio-psychological accuracy of this
stance. The liberal notion that a person exists prior to, or apart from, group affiliation has
received ample criticism, and I will not defend it here other than to say that it pervades
American jurisprudence beyond negligence law-as any litigator who has tried to argue for, say,
"group rights," or a deterministic evasion of criminal responsibility, can attest. Cf. Seavey,
supra note 37, at 1-2 & n.2 (noting that much that underlies negligence law, especially the
notion of "a mind and will which directs a bodily mechanism," "is out of line with modern
scientific thought"; key distinctions "are very likely scientifically incorrect").
83. See generally Stephen A. Gardbaum, Law, Politics, and the Claims of Community, 90
MICH. L. REV. 685, 688 (1992) (arguing that "community" and "communitarianism" have
multiple meanings within legal theory).
84. AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 374 (4th ed. 2000)
[hereinafter AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY].
85. See Sarah E. Waldeck, Cops, Community Policing, and the Social Norms Approach to
Crime Control. Should One Make Us More Comfortable with the Others?, 34 GA. L. REV. 1253,
1286-87 (2000) (noting some problems with a geography-based definition of community
policing).
86. An example of geographic constraint: should authorities announce a plan to expand
Hartsfield Airport, I, who live in a house that I own in Atlanta, could join a geographic
"community" to protest in court. But if I tried to become a party to a similar lawsuit protesting
an expansion of the Orange County airport in California, I would fail, even if I identified myself
sincerely as a member of a national community of concerned citizens, because I would not have
to live with the externalities of an Orange County airport expansion.
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cupboard rattle, your air becomes polluted, a sex offender who could
hurt you moves nearby-does the law take an interest in geography-
based community.
Thus far, the working definition of community has lined up with
at least part of a conventional understanding of the word. In addition
to geography, the themes of "similarity" and "common interests" are
found in both my dictionary and my use of the word in this Article. I
become more revisionist, however, in rejecting shared interactions or
fellowship as integral to the word.87 For instance, the community of
deaf persons, as I am using the word here, aggregates every deaf
person with all other deaf people-some of whom might not even
know, let alone relate to, even one other person who is deaf.88 In the
case of children, negligence law identifies a community of persons
who have no formal input into the standard of care to which they will
be held. These meanings certainly seem illiberal, much more so than
forcing a professional to comply with group norms that she can
influence, and that identify her as a person who communicates and
interacts with peers in a chosen endeavor. But it is the social need for
constraint, or "security" as contemporary torts scholars have put the
point, that creates this illiberality; negligence law comes by it only
derivatively.
This reference to the function of negligence law suggests several
pragmatic criteria for determining whether membership in a particu-
lar group will affect an actor's standard of care. First, the group must
impose fetters that limit a member-actor from engaging in risky
behavior: women and Jews, as I mentioned, are among the many
groups that get no subjective standard. Second, the negligence
system must be able to administer the subjective exception. This
criterion, commonly labeled as "verifiability" or "administrative
87. See AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY, supra note 84, at 374 (providing etymology
from the Latin communitas, or fellowship, which suggests interaction). Here I note the
suggestion of Richard Wright that a better term than "communities" in this Article would have
been "unordinary people," meaning persons who are exempted from the objective standard
because of their unusual characteristics. "Community," argues Professor Wright, necessarily
presupposes interaction among the membership, an element missing from my working
definition. I take the point, but still prefer an existing word to a neologism, and also want to
help undo a recurring mischief in legal scholarship: "community" and "communitarianism" in
law are tied to constraint, and constraint-free definitions of the word "community" do not
belong within the law.
88. It may be necessary to repeat that I am not making a comment on any person's essence,
but rather on the stance of negligence law with respect to that person's actions when these
actions are challenged as substandard. Cf. supra note 82 (conceding that various premises of
negligence doctrine may be unsound).
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convenience,"89 includes recognition within the system of common
law adjudication: a newly formed or recently identified group might
truly constrain an actor-member, but until the negligence system has
grown accustomed to the category through experience in litigation, it
cannot acknowledge the group with a subjective standard. A third
point relates to the risk of abuse, a theme present in "verifiability":
no actor should be allowed to assert group membership as a free pass,
a retreat from the rigors of an objective standard, if she was not really
constrained by the deviating condition at the time of the injury.
Accordingly, negligence law requires the actor who gains the benefit
of a subjective standard to have been a member of the group before
the accident occurred.90
"Community" in this sense thus helps to answer the three
standard-of-care questions summarized in Part I, especially the first
and second, but also the third. In response to the first "puzzle," we
may now characterize the objective standard as the means by which
"ordinary" people, posited to be free of group memberships that
constrain them, are inhibited from imposing excess risk to the security
of others. The objective standard is necessary because these people
would be otherwise too free to inflict injury.91 As a corollary, and
with respect to the second question, subjective exceptions relate to
various group-based constraints. The distinction between negligence
and contributory negligence noted in the third question also rests on
constraint. I take up that last point below, at the end of Part III.
III. THE COMMUNITIES OF NEGLIGENCE LAW
Here we assess the communities that negligence law honors, or
fails to honor, with a subjective standard.
89. See supra note 65.
90. Robert Cochran and Christina Bohannan have separately suggested to me another
possible criterion: they perceive the standard of care in terms of something like empathy or
sympathetic imagination. When an outsider like a juror or judge can think of the actor's
characteristics as something affecting himself or herself, the characteristics get taken into
account. While acknowledging the influence of this idea on my thinking, I find the empathy
paradigm too vague and indeterminate to be a criterion.
91. Disagreeing slightly with this characterization, Jean Love has contended to me that the
objective standard can be understood simply as a device to compensate injured persons, with
the subjective variations providing intermittent relief to defendants in settings where the law
wishes to treat them leniently. Although I prefer my own thesis, in part because it fits better
with the fact that subjective standards offer more than mere lenity to actors, see supra text
accompanying notes 45-46, I believe Professor Love's account elegantly explains many of the
controversies that roil standards of care.
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A. The Community of Children
Adults often deny that to be a child is to live under deeply chaf-
ing constraint. For children, constraint comes from both physical
weakness-small stature, impatience, inexperience, inchoate powers
of coordination, and the like-and domineering caretakers. 92
Whereas children experience their lives as permeated with an often
bewildering authoritarianism, adults imagine them as free from, say,
mortgage payments (individually chosen and advantageous con-
tracts), the daily grind of employment (less freely selected, but still a
venue of personal choice), emotional obligations (a source of deep
satisfaction), or legal accountability for one's actions (a condition that
has always been linked to privileges). "Bertrand Russell said that
every child has dreams of power-just as adults have sexual-wish
dreams," mused Astrid Lindgren,93 the most widely translated writer
in Swedish history.94 "And when I read that, I thought, that's why
Pippi's so popular."95
As readers may remember, the fictitious child Pippi lives alone in
a big house that she doesn't bother to keep clean.96 She disdains
school as the quintessence of irrational and tedious adult authority.
Because she possesses an undepletable stash of gold coins, left for her
by a long-gone pirate father, she can tell anybody to go to hell. This
character is the exact opposite of "children" in negligence, who are so
lacking in freedom that they do not need the sanctions of tort law to
keep them in line.
Standard accounts of a separate standard for children, neglecting
this crucial attention to their lack of freedom A la Pippi Longstocking,
do not say convincingly why negligence law pays attention to the
actor's status as a child. Consider the rationale of the Third Restate-
ment:
92. The latter condition may be more significant than the former. See generally Jessica
Kulynych, No Playing in the Public Sphere: Democratic Theory and the Exclusion of Children.
27 Soc. THEORY & PRAC. 231 (2001) (characterizing children as oppressed, segregated, and
disenfranchised).
93. Martha Sherrill, Astrid Lindgren and Her 'Pippi' Power; The Children's Author as
Animal Advocate, WASH. POST, Mar. 20, 1989, at B1.
94. Paul Binding, Books for Children: Astrid at 90, THE INDEPENDENT, Dec. 7. 1997. at 30
(noting that Pippi Longstocking has been translated into 50 languages, with more than five
million copies of the English edition having been sold).
95. Sherrill, supra note 93.
96. ASTRID LINDGREN, PiPPI LONGSTOCKING (Florence Lamborn trans.. Puffin 1997)
(1950); ASTRID LINDGREN, PiPPi GOES ON BOARD (Florence Lamborn trans., Puffin 1997)
(1957); ASTRID LINDGREN, PIPPI IN THE SOUTH SEAS (Gerry Bothmer trans., Puffin 1997)
(1959).
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Children are less able than adults to maintain an attitude of atten-
tiveness towards the risks their conduct may occasion, and the risks
to which they may be exposed. Similarly, children are less able
than adults to understand risks, to appreciate alternative courses of
conduct with respect to risks, and to make appropriate choices from
among those alternatives.97
Well and good, but these same conditions pertain equally to some
mentally disabled persons, a category that the Restatement refuses to
recognize with subjective deviation. A second rationale is the
developmental one: "children have to learn to be careful, and ought
not be exposed to tort liability for conduct that is reasonable in light
of their stage of development during the learning process."98 Again
well and good-few would quarrel with the statement that children
are developing-but why then does negligence law treat children like
adults when they engage in "adult activities" or "dangerous activi-
ties," behaviors that also take place in a context of growing up?
The concept of community-as-constraint helps to complete the
rationale supporting a subjective standard for actors who are
children. In this perspective, the infirmities of childhood are not
fundamentally deficiencies in wisdom or experience from which many
people who are not children suffer-without winning recognition
from tort law-but rather illustrations of unfreedom.99 Unfreedom
best explains the lenient treatment that children receive from
negligence doctrine. If children are merely heedless, feckless, and
inattentive by nature, as the Third Restatement implies-little
accident-bombs likely to go off at any time -then tort doctrine should
respond not with leniency but by imposing stringent duties of
supervision on adult caretakers, or perhaps strict liability on the
children themselves, in a status-based analogy to "abnormally
dangerous activities."OO
97. BASIC PRINCIPLES. supra note 39, § 10 cmt. b.
98. JOSEPH W. GLANNON, THE LAW OF TORTS 67 (1995).
99. Thus it seems to me that Caroline Forell is on to something, but ultimately gets it
wrong, when she coins the phrase "carefree activities" as the antithesis of adult activities.
Forell. supra note 41. at 485. The ambiguous "carefree" has several potential meanings, of
which Forell's definitional phrase-"activities where, even if the minor uses poor judgment,
harm to others is very unlikely." id.-is not the most obvious. With "carefree," Forell is getting
at a concept like "unfree," an adjective that corresponds better with the case law. For instance,
courts consistently deem children younger than four incapable of negligence and contributory
negligence. See BASIC PRINCIPLES, supra note 39, § 10, Reporters' Note, at 139-42. From this
incapacity, it follows that the activities that very young children undertake are unfree, rather
than carefree.
100. See BASIC PRINCIPLES. supra note 39, § 20 (describing the category of abnormally
dangerous activities and imposing strict liability for resultant injuries).
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A similar confusion about unfreedom is manifest in the inability
of judges and commentators to come up with a label for such
activities as driving an automobile or operating a snowmobile. The
leading case on this point declined to propound an analytic category,
and simply asserted that operating an automobile, airplane, or
powerboat would subject an actor to the adult-level objective
standard, even if he were a child;lo0 Professor Dobbs rightly objects
to the absence of a label.102 The most accepted analytic summaries of
the exception are "adult activity" and "inherently dangerous"; both
labels have been rightly criticized as misleading.0 3
The "communities" concept, by contrast, recognizes that some
children may take a bold step toward freedom, away from the
authoritarian constraints that limit their movements. In this sense the
terms "adult activity" and "inherently dangerous" each tell a part of
the story. Like a volunteer soldier, a mortgagor, or a citizen whose
driver's license signifies both a privilege to operate an automobile
and vulnerability to jury duty, this actor has assumed the combination
of selected risks, pleasures, and accountability that characterizes
autonomous adult life. Having renounced the shackles of childhood
in pursuit of a risky activity, she must accept in their place the rigors
of adult-level reasonable care. t04
101. See Dellwo v. Pearson, 107 N.W.2d 859 (Minn. 1961).
102. See DOBBS, supra note 16. at 300 ("The mere list of activities in Dellwo v. Pearson,
though perhaps a circumspect beginning, hardly describes for lawyers the other kinds of
activities that are indistinguishable in principle. If the list is the thing and not a principle behind
it, it will be impossible to know what other activities should be added to the list.").
103. See, e.g.. id. at 299-300. Professor Dobbs relates criticism that the "adult activities"
definition "both ... goes too far and.., does not go far enough to impose responsibility," and
notes that automobile driving, the quintessential activity covered by this exception. is "hardly
one that is normally engaged in only by adults." Id. at 300. With respect to the "inherently
dangerous" definition. Dobbs suggests that "inherent danger is like beauty, to be found in the
eye of the beholder." Id.
104. This stance permits me to stray from the prevailing scholarly view that the operation of
firearms should subject the actor to an adult-level objective standard of care. See BASIC
PRINCIPLES, supra note 39. §10 cmt. f; Forell, supra note 47, at 490. Notwithstanding this
commentary from writers who happen to live in large cities, or the northern United States, most
courts that have passed on this question favor a child standard of care for children who operate
firearms. See BASIC PRINCIPLES, supra note 39, Reporters' Note at 144-45 (citing cases). The
communities thesis lines up with the holdings of most courts, recognizing that in some locales a
youngster who picks up a shotgun is not thereby making a claim to adult freedom. This activity,
like after-school soccer in other regions, can fit into a child's routine. Elsewhere, the use of
firearms will signify a clear repudiation of childhood constraints.
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B. The Community of Persons with Physical Disabilities
This relatively tranquil corner of negligence law needs only brief
discussion here. In the vernacular, "disabled" and "handicapped"
posit that a minority of human beings are constrained by the visible,
verifiable, "objective" condition of their bodies. Although a growing
disabilities studies movement has challenged the belief that it is
immutable physical deficiencies-rather than mutable social prac-
tices-that constrain,105 current negligence law still operates under
this conception. Seen through the community-as-constraint lens,
certain physical aspects distinguish the actor from the undifferenti-
ated reasonable person.
A leading treatise divides the rule about physical disabilities into
a "protective" side and a "demanding" side;106 both concepts rely on
the notion of constraint. The "protective" rationale emerges in
William Prosser's proclamation that the disabled person is entitled to
"live in the world," and should accordingly not be deemed negligent,
for instance, merely because he went out into the world unable to
see. 107 The communities-as-constraint thesis perceives the physically
handicapped person as entitled to a protective deviation from the
objective standard because her disability serves to limit her freedom
to engage in risky behaviors. The "demanding" side of the rule, as
was noted above, will occasionally require a disabled person to invest
more in precautions, or to do something more, than would be
required of a non-disabled person.1os Here again, the communities-
as-constraint thesis recognizes that a subjective standard does not
signify a free pass, but rather a different set of shackles. Instead of
being held to the rigorous reasonable person standard, the actor is
held to a comparably rigorous set of demands related to disability.
C. The Community of Persons with Mental Disabilities
Decisional law about mentally disabled defendants' negligence
(as contrasted with plaintiffs' negligence) is relatively sparse; these
cases, throughout the last hundred years or so, have almost always
105. See generally LENNARD J. DAVIS, ENFORCING NORMALCY: DISABILITY, DEAFNESS,
AND THE BODY 24-26 (1995) (describing disability as a social construct rooted in nineteenth-
century notions about "the norm"). A related literature makes a similar claim about children.
See Kulynych, supra note 92, at 243-45.
106. DOBBS, supra note 16, at 282-83.
107. KEETON ET AL., supra note 22, at 176.
108. See supra notes 38-39, 51-54 and accompanying text.
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refused to recognize this disability as a basis for deviating from the
objective standard.109 Scholars have maintained steady opposition to
this approach.IN) Notable among these dissidents was Oliver Wendell
Holmes, patriarch of the objective standard, who believed that any
"insanity of a pronounced type [that] manifestly incapacitat[ed] the
sufferer from complying with the rule" should excuse what would
otherwise have been negligent conduct.'II
The three Restatements document a long struggle on this point.
Leading authorities of the First Restatement generation favored a
subjective rather than an objective standard for the mentally dis-
abled.112 According to one writer, the absence of a position on the
tort liability of mentally disabled actors in the First Restatement marks
a now-bygone hope among its reporters that silence on the point
would change the direction of decisional law.113 When the Second
Restatement abandoned this neutrality and prescribed an objective
standard for mentally disabled actors,1 4 it also clung a little to the old
hope, noting that "in the case of negligence, the mental condition may
rob the individual of all capacity to understand and appreciate the
risk involved in his conduct or to take the proper precautions against
that risk, so there is no negligence to be found."115 The Third
Restatement abandons this struggle and does not equivocate: "Unless
the actor is a child, the actor's mental or emotional disability is not
considered in determining whether conduct is negligent."'16
If there exists a community of mentally disabled actors, then, this
community has a status in negligence law that is shakier than that of
physically disabled actors or children. This denial has proved hard to
defend, especially in post-1991 writings that must take into account
109. For citations to contemporary case law, ranging from 1961 to 2000, see BASIC
PRINCIPLES, supra note 39, § 11, Reporters' Note at 159. Earlier cases, ranging from 1887
through 1992, are cited in Korrell, supra note 18, at 4 n.10.
110. Contemporary critics argue that this almost univocal line of decisions relies on an
unreliable scrap of seventeenth-century dicta about "a lunatick." See Goldstein, supra note 18,
at 68-69 (quoting Weaver v. Ward, 80 Eng. Rep. 284 (K.B. 1616)); Richards, supra note 18, at
627-28 (same).
111. HOLMES, supra note 24, at 109.
112. See Jacobi, supra note 18, at 106 & n.65 (relating the views of James Barr Ames,
Francis H. Bohlen, and W.G.H. Cook).
113. See William J. Curran. Tort Liability of the Mentally Ill and Mentally Deficient, 21 OHIO
ST. L.J. 52, 53 (1960).
114. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283B (1965). One commentator sees this 1948
decision of the American Law Institute as a concession of "defeat"; commentators had tried and
failed to achieve a contrary rule in the courts. Korrell, supra note 18, at 5-6.
115. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895J cmt. c (1965).
116. BASIC PRINCIPLES, supra note 39, § 11(c).
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the Americans with Disabilities Act:117 a federal statute, said to reign
"supreme" above the common law, has deemed disabling mental
conditions no less real than other kinds of disability.118 The attempt
at a rationale for the unitary objective standard found in the Third
Restatement is pertinent:
It is useful to distinguish between limited or moderate mental dis-
orders and those disorders that are the most serious, such as psy-
choses. The former are disregarded partly because they ordinarily
are not especially important as an explanation for conduct and also
because of the problems of administratability that would be en-
countered in attempting to identify them and assess their signifi-
cance. The disregard of more serious mental disorders is also based
in part on administrative considerations.' 19
Regarding serious mental illness, these administrative considerations
are (1) the discouraging track record of the insanity defense in
criminal law, (2) difficulties in establishing a causal connection
between a mental disorder and conduct that appears unreasonable,
and (3) the inference to be drawn from deinstitutionalization, which is
that persons with severe mental illness should pay for the harms
caused by their substandard conduct.120
This comment to the blackletter pays attention to the salient
characteristics of mentally disabled actors, but adds a couple of
unfortunate distractions: neither the insanity defense in criminal law
nor deinstitutionalization as a social policy can support a position
within negligence doctrine. Let us note what is helpful. The Restate-
ment distinguishes between "limited or moderate" disorders and
"serious" disorders. The adjectives speak, in different ways, to
constraint. "Limited or moderate" conditions are those that add a
wrinkle of complication-one might speak of "personality"-to an
individual's psychological life. They do not constrain.21 "Serious"
disorders do not constrain either, at least not in a sense relevant to
117. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12,101-12,213 (2002).
118. Id. § 12.101(a)(1): Jacobi, supra note 18, at 136 ("Where state common law conflicts
with the ADA, the ADA must prevail because federal law is supreme.") (citing the United
States Constitution).
119. BASIC PRINCIPLES, supra note 39. § 11 cmt. e.
120. Id.
121. Yiddish-English speakers sometimes refer to their "own mishugaas." Mishugaas,
literally craziness or insanity, figuratively connotes a mild, benign, even humorous eccentricity.
We each have a comparable share of mishugaas, goes the premise. although we vary as to its
manifestations. This universal trait would not entitle an actor to a deviation from the objective
standard of care. I do not mean to suggest that all persons suffer from (at least) "limited or
moderate" mental disorders, only that the notion of a nondisabling, nonconstraining mental
disorder is familiar.
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negligence law. Although a mental disability can limit freedom
severely-illnesses like psychosis keep people from education,
employment, communication, satisfying personal relationships, and
other sources of expression-it does not stop an actor from imposing
risks on others. 22 Because of their tendency to obstruct prudence
and foresight, these kinds of disability constrain an actor more from
taking precautions than from roaming freely in a risky manner.
Thus, neither a "limited" nor a "moderate" nor a "serious" men-
tal disorder shackles an actor in a way that negligence law will
recognize. Without constraint, there is no community; without a
community to serve as its reference point, negligence law cannot
sustain a systematic deviation from the objective standard. Secon-
dary arguments about administration (such as a policy in favor of
deinstitutionalization, the need to impose incentives of care on family
members, or the difficulty of proving both the existence of a condi-
tion and its causal significance) may or may not be of interest,
depending at any time on how the policy winds blow.123 Although
new understandings about the nature of mental illness will at a future
date likely modify the standard of care in negligence, the function of
constraint stays relatively constant.
D. Malpractice and Professional Communities
Similar to its recognition of disabilities in terms of their con-
straint, negligence law regards professions and occupations in terms
of the degree of force they exert on individuals who make up their
membership. The concept of "custom" aids the standard of care. For
most subgroups, negligence law deems occupational custom on
matters pertaining to safety to be relevant, but not determinative of
any outcome: "inconclusive evidence of due care," as Professor
122. One reader queries whether I have satisfactorily distinguished children from the
mentally disabled in this respect. Certainly in this description children and the mentally
disabled appear similarly uninhibited. But I perceive the constraint of childhood as comprised
of physical weakness, as well as lack of socialization or inhibition. See supra note 92 and
accompanying text.
123. The comment in Basic Principles goes on to remark that "deinstitutionalization
becomes more socially acceptable if innocent victims are at least assured of opportunity for
compensation when they suffer injury." BASIC PRINCIPLES. supra note 39, § II cmt. e. Because
negligence law does not start a priori with a preference for deinstitutionalization (the way it
does start, for instance, with a preference for safety), using the deinstitutionalization trend or
movement in support of a rule is puzzling. One might expect similar blowing-in-the-wind
variation in the way medical experts, and then lawyers, choose to deal with the neurobiological
bases of mental disorders. See id. (conceding that "many mental disabilities have organic
causes").
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Dobbs has phrased the rule.124 Seen in terms of the communities
thesis, this stance regards custom as a distinct but mild source of
constraint. An actor who complies with occupational custom about
safety implicitly acknowledges the force of community membership
as a limit on her freedom; an actor who defies a safety norm expresses
disregard for security, and her antagonist can call her to account by
introducing this custom into evidence against her.
As was mentioned, physicians stand at the apex of custom in
negligence law: whereas courts evaluating claims of malpractice or
other occupational negligence against members of many other
occupations think of custom as merely relevant or admissible, the law
of medical malpractice equates custom or substantially accepted
practice with the standard of care. 125 "In negligence suits against
railroads, banks, drovers, or any defendant other than a medico,"
according to a leading treatise, "the plaintiffs usually need not prove
that the defendants departed from the ways of their craft, and the
defendants do not escape liability, as a matter of law, merely by
showing that they acted like others following the same occupation."12 6
This "anomaly"127 bespeaks an unusual degree of constraint within
the profession of medicine.
Public health scholar Marshall Kapp depicts physicians as work-
ing under conditions of profound and internalized constraint:
Tort standards require that physicians provide reasonable care un-
der the circumstances, as judged against the level of knowledge and
skill exercised by their professional peers .... By contrast, most
physicians impose a considerably higher standard on themselves
and their colleagues: namely, perfection. Physicians are profes-
sionally socialized into a "culture of infallibility," in which errors in
patient care are ... manifestations of unacceptable character
flaws.... In light of this perfectionist mentality, being accused in a
public forum, such as a court, of committing an error by an external
scrutinizer cannot be interpreted by the physician in any manner
other than as a deeply personal affront. 128
Constraint-through-cohesion characterized this community
throughout the twentieth century. For decades a potent norm of
124. DOBBS, supra note 16, at 393; see generally Steven Hetcher, Creating Safe Social Norms
in a Dangerous World, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 5 (1999) (noting dominance of the "evidentiary"
approach to custom).
125. See supra notes 22. 43-44 and accompanying text.
126. MORRIS & MORRIS. supra note 16, at 56.
127. Id.
128. Marshall B. Kapp. Medical Error Versus Malpractice, 1 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L.
751. 755 (1997) (citations omitted).
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cohesion kept physicians from testifying against one another in
court. 129 The medical establishment spent decades fending off one
group of potential competitors so vigorously that a federal court
found the American Medical Association, along with eleven other
prominent professional groups working in a tight and cohesive
strategy, to have violated the Sherman Act thereby.130 For decades
American physicians only rarely would retire early, or switch to a
different line of work, preferring to remain as long as possible in their
identity-forming vocation.131 Although many believe that this unity
has deteriorated, 132 for the time being the medical profession is still
uniquely cohesive and constraining; it maintains a unique hold over
its members. 133 And so negligence law still pays this profession the
unique tribute of an especially staunch exception to the unitary,
objective standard of care.134
129. See DIAMOND ET AL., supra note 16, at 107-08 (noting that in the past, plaintiffs
"frequently could not find a doctor willing to testify against the defendant due to fear of
ostracism by other doctors in the community"). In a 1999 speech before an audience of Danish
physicians, the president-elect of the American Medical Association recounted that in 1934 the
journal Medical Economics reported that it was impossible to recover a judgment against a
physician for malpractice. See Thomas R. Reardon, First, Do No Harm: Medical Liability in the
United States, Address Before the Danish Medical Association Conference (Jan. 18, 1999), in
65 VITAL SPEECHES OF THE DAY 399, 401 (1999).
130. See Wilk v. Am. Med. Ass'n, 895 F.2d 352 (7th Cir. 1990) (upholding antitrust claim of
plaintiff chiropractors). Until 1980, AMA policy prohibited physician-members from
associating with chiropractors. See id. at 356.
131. See Patrick Morrison, Frustrated Docs Take New Roles, INDIANAPOLIS Bus. J., July
16-22, 2001, at 23.
132. Judge Posner has offered an unsentimental summary of how cohesion in the medical
profession has grown weak:
[Tlhe explosion of medical knowledge... has been accompanied by a rapid decline in
the mystique elements formerly so conspicuous in this profession-highly
discriminatory selection practices, the concealment of carelessness and incompetence
(the "conspiracy of silence" and the often literal "burying of mistakes"), the
physician's assumption of omniscience in dealing with patients and refusal to level with
patients with regard to prognoses, hostility to forms of health maintenance that do not
require esoteric medical skills (such as diet and exercise) .... [and] disdain for outsider
methods or disciplines such as statistics and public health ....
Richard A. Posner, Professionalisms, 40 ARIz. L. REV. 1, 10 (1998).
133. See John R. Siberski, Medicine: Vocation or Job?, AMERICA, May 25, 1996, at 22
(insisting that the contemporary profession of medicine is more properly described as a
"vocation" than as a "job" and emphasizing the concept of "a higher calling").
134. In recent years, the legal profession has come closer to achieving a similar tribute. See
Developments in the Law-Lawyers' Responsibilities and Lawyers' Responses, 107 HARV. L.
REV. 1547, 1564 (1994) (noting that although at one time judges hearing legal malpractice
claims would routinely refuse to admit expert testimony, "courts in a majority of jurisdictions
now require that a malpractice plaintiff present testimony from a qualified expert on the
particular requirements of the standard of care and the defendant's fulfillment of those
obligations"). Nevertheless, legal malpractice still contains a "common knowledge" exception
generally unavailable to plaintiffs in medical malpractice, see DOBBS, supra note 16, at 1390, and
legal malpractice still lacks well-developed case law on the necessity of specialist expert
witnesses. See id. at 1389.
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E. Postscript: Constraint without Preexisting Groups, or a
Community in the Moment
The communities thesis indirectly helps to solve the third stan-
dard of care puzzle: why courts often treat negligent plaintiffs more
leniently than negligent defendants. The thesis is also germane to
another aspect of the standard of care not previously discussed
here-the judicial recognition that emergency and sudden incapacity
release actors from some of the demands made by the objective
standard.135 Once constraint comes to the fore, observers can more
easily see why these actors often gain a favorable deviation from the
objective ideal.
With respect to contributory negligence, courts start from an
axiom that persons do not wish to harm themselves; human beings
are constrained by a law of self-preservation. As one commentator
recounts, the notion of self-love, or the desire to keep oneself alive
and well, pervades Western political philosophy and American
jurisprudence.136 This premise may explain the existence of a self-
defense privilege in tort and criminal law,137 and it underlies the
presumption of due care that will benefit plaintiffs (generally
deceased plaintiffs) when a defendant wants to imply that a plaintiff
might have helped to cause his own injury through negligence.138
135. See DOBBS, supra note 16, at 282, 284 & n.22.
136. See Adam Schoeberlein, Better to Be Judged by Twelve than Carried by Six: The Need
for an "Against-Self-Preservation" Interest Exception to the Hearsay Rule, 38 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
373, 385-88 (2001).
137. See id. at 388.
138. As the Pennsylvania Supreme Court once wrote, the presumption of due care is "based
on the tenacious and objective reality that life is sweet and death is cruel, and, in the case of
railroad accidents, is founded on the unassailable logic that no one wants to engage in a duel
with a locomotive." Travis v. Pa. R.R. Co., 105 A.2d 131, 133 (Pa. 1954). Reminiscent of Gary
Schwartz's suggestion that plaintiffs no longer need a presumption in their favor because they
have received the boon of comparative fault, some judges have written that the presumption of
due care does not survive the abandonment of contributory negligence. See, e.g., Rice v.
Shuman, 519 A.2d 391, 394 (Pa. 1986) (noting that although "[a] definitive resolution by this
Court of the impact of comparative negligence upon the continuing viability of the presumption
of due care" has proved elusive in Pennsylvania, the instant case demonstrates that the
presumption should be abandoned); Simpson v. Anderson, 517 P.2d 416. 417 (Colo. App. 1973)
(deeming the presumption superseded by comparative negligence), rev'd on other grounds, 526
P.2d 298 (Colo. 1974). As with post-comparative negligence double standards, see supra text
accompanying notes 69-76, many contemporary judges seem to disagree, and have reiterated
their support for the presumption in favor of plaintiffs following the advent of comparative
fault. For cases from comparative negligence jurisdictions affirming the presumption of due
care, see Johnston v. Pierce Packing Co., 550 F.2d 474, 476 (9th Cir. 1977) (applying Idaho law).
McQuay v. Schertle, 730 A.2d 714, 738 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1999); Duke v. Am. Olean Tile Co.,
400 N.w.2d 677, 683 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986). But see Elias v. City of St. Paul. 350 N.W.2d 442,
444 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
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More than just a reiteration of the rule that defendants bear the
burden of proof with respect to plaintiffs'-conduct defenses, the
presumption of due care will often give plaintiffs the benefit of an
instruction directing the jury "to consider and bear in mind that there
is, in every man, an instinct of self-preservation which is ordinarily
reflected in the exercise of due care and in the avoidance of dan-
ger."1 39 Constrained always by self-regard, actors will enjoy a more
lenient standard of care when it is themselves that they put at risk: the
shackles that negligence law always demands are in place.
In recognizing both emergency and sudden incapacity as condi-
tions that mitigate the rigors of the reasonable person standard,40 the
Third Restatement notes indirectly, yet clearly, that constraint is at the
center of these exceptions. Comments to the blackletter observe that
in an emergency: a response may be "instinctive rather than delibera-
tive,"14 and "the opportunities for deliberation have been limited by
severe time pressures;" 142 in short, that the actor had no ability to
behave differently. Here the actor has not joined a community,
except in an attenuated and metaphoric sense of being forced into a
fleeting moment of constraint. She is still held to the objective
standard, but with regard for that brief hampering of her freedom.143
139. Moore v. Esso Standard Oil Co., 72 A.2d 117. 120 (Pa. 1950) (emphasis omitted).
140. See BASIC PRINCIPLES. supra note 39, § 9 (identifying "an unexpected emergency
requiring rapid response" as "a circumstance to be taken into account in determining whether
the actor's resulting conduct is that of the reasonably careful person"); id. § 11(b) (treating
conduct caused by unforeseeable "sudden incapacitation or loss of consciousness brought about
by physical illness" as not negligent).
141. Id. § 9 cmt. a.
142. Id.
143. Negligence law contains numerous analogies to this doctrinal recognition of episodic or
fleeting constraint. For example, the famous "danger invites rescue" proclamation in Wagner v.
International Railway Co., 133 N.E. 437, 437 (N.Y. 1921) (Cardozo, J.), may be understood as
holding that because the plaintiff was constrained to rescue, his rescue venture was not a
superseding cause of his injury. The rescue rule has been reaffirmed in the comparative fault
era, suggesting (once again) that lenient treatment of a class of plaintiffs is more than a vestige
of contributory negligence. See Hollingsworth v. Schminkey, 553 N.W.2d 591, 598 (Iowa 1996):
Solomon v. Shuell, 457 N.W.2d 669, 683 (Mich. 1990); Govich v. N. Am. Sys., Inc.. 814 P.2d 94,
100 (N.M. 1991). Another analogy is the exception to the "firefighter's rule" when the
firefighter or other professional rescuer suffers injuries while trying to give aid outside the
confines of professional obligation: although tort law generally denies recovery to professional
rescuers, courts treat these professional rescuers more leniently when they encounter the danger
under conditions other than the rescue work that they have accepted as an occupational project.
See, e.g.. Webb v. Jarvis. 553 N.E.2d 151, 157 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990) (noting that plaintiff had been
present at rescue as a relative, not as a police officer); Gray v. Russell, 853 S.W.2d 928, 930 (Mo.
1993) (holding that the firefighter's rule does not apply when officer encountered the danger in
a nonemergency setting); Labrie v. Pace Membership Warehouse, 678 A.2d 867, 868-69, 871
(R.I. 1996) (noting that firefighter was present for a routine, planned inspection, "in a shirt and
tie"). Seen through the constraint lens, an on-the-job rescue follows an autonomous choice to
pursue this work and therefore can leave the rescuer disadvantaged in tort law, whereas injuries
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CONCLUSION
Lon Fuller in The Morality of Law included a chapter on func-
tion and called it "The Morality That Makes Law Possible,"144 an apt
and assonant phrase that I invoke in the title of this Article in order
to comment on the role of subgroups, or communities, in negligence
law. Morality here does not reduce to moralism: instead, Fuller
insisted that the law cannot function-it would collapse, or cease to
exist-without certain precepts of fair play.145 In this Article I have
taken inspiration from Fuller's phrase while deferring for another
time, or another writer, all prescriptive or normative claims about
"morality," focusing instead on negligence law as an institution that
works.
"Communities," in the sense that I have used the term, are to
negligence law as Fuller's background precepts (with respect to
justice) are to the rule of law generally. Negligence doctrine is not
"possible" without this extrinsic support. Its task of advancing both
freedom and security-goods that often come each at the expense of
the other-will put great pressure on negligence law, especially given
the context of anxiety (if not also calamitous injury) that typically
affects the litigants. Negligence doctrine needs an ally, and finds one
in the social fact of group membership. Like the notion of deterrence
that pervades current understandings of accident law, group member-
ship inhibits an actor from engaging in risky behavior. Unlike tort-
derived deterrence, however, this constraint is perceived as extrinsic
to negligence law; so when group membership serves to constrain, the
negligence liability system gains the benefit of constraint without
suffering the political detriment of appearing repressive.
Different groups serve to constrain in varying ways. Certain
subgroups expressly encourage their members to behave in a prudent
manner; some accept responsibility for chafing their members and
thereby divert resentment away from the negligence regime; a few
may be understood as sources of disability in a literal sense, making
not attributable to the volunteered-for rescue work suggest that the rescuer was trapped, or
otherwise constrained, in a situation; because the freedom-security balance tilts the other way,
she is entitled to a favorable exception to the firefighter's rule and her injuries are compensable.
144. LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 33-94 (rev. ed. 1977).
145. These precepts describe the necessary content and function of rules: rules must be
general; they must be promulgated so that affected persons can know them: they must be
prospective rather than retroactive; they must be clear and understandable; they should strive to
be free from contradictions; they must not require the impossible; they must not be frequently
changed; and official action should be congruent with the law. See id. at 38-39.
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persons less able to engage in risky activities. For the negligence
system, groups also provide an administratively convenient method of
combining an objective standard of care with some limited attention
to the actor's circumstances. As sources of constraint, and thus
adjuvants to negligence doctrine, groups do much of the work that
negligence law would otherwise have to undertake. These communi-
ties make standards of care possible: negligence law could not
function without their support.
